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INTRODUCTION
Affluent  nations'  perception  of a  refugee  crisis  has  led  them  to  ex-
plore  various  methods  for preventing  refugees  from  entering  their  refu-
gee  processing  systems  from  the  outset.'  These  strategies  often  include
shifting the  scene of encounters  with refugees  to  the high  seas or to  the
territory  of poorer  neighbors,  thereby  raising  the  question  of the  extent
to which a  state can  liberate  itself from  legal  obligations  by  transferring
its  operations  outside  its  borders.2  This  Article  explores  one  version  of
that question:  international  human  rights  constraints  on the  return of ref-
ugees  stopped  outside  the  territory  of the  returning  nation.  Because  the
U.S.  Supreme  Court has  held that  the primary  nonrefoulement  obligation
contained  in  the  1951  Convention  Relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees3
does  not  apply  extraterritorially,  this  Article  will  concentrate  on
nonrefoulement  obligations  that  arise  from  sources  other  than  the  Refu-
*  Professor of Law,  Columbia University  School  of Law.  I owe  thanks  to Lori  Fisler
Damrosch, Edith Friedler,  Claudio Grossman,  and above all  to Louis Henkin.  I should dis-
close  that I have  advised  counsel  for Haitian refugees,  and  have  written amicus  briefs in
support of thple aintiffs in the Haitian  Centers Council  litigation.
1.  David  A.  Martin,  Strategies for a Resistant World:  Human Rights  Initiatives
and  the  Need for Alternatives to  Refugee  Interdiction, 26  CORNELL  I,'L  L.J.  753.
754  (1993);  Gerald  L. Neuman,  Buffer Zones Against Refugees:  Dublin, Schengen, and
the  German Asylum  Amendment,  33  VA.  J.  INT'L  L.  503  (1993).
2.  Under  the  United  States  Constitution,  the  answer  appears  to  be  yes,  some-
times.  See  United  States  v.  Verdugo-Urquidez,  494  U.S.  259  (1990)  (holding  that  U.S.
agents'  search  of  a  nonresident  alien's  home  in  Mexico  was  not  governed  by  the
Fourth  Amendment);  Gerald  L.  Neuman,  Whose  Constitution?,  100  YALE  LJ.  909,
971-76  (1991)  (analyzing  Verdugo-Urquidez).
3.  Convention  Relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees,  July  28,  1951,  art.  33,  19
U.S.T.  6260,  189  U.N.T.S.  137  [hereinafter  Refugee  Convention].
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gee  Convention,  in  particular,  the  Convention  Against  Torture4  and  the
International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights.'
I.  NONREFOULEMENT  AS  A  RIGHT,  REMEDY,  AND  RULE
OF  STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The  French  verb  "refouler,"  and  the  noun  "refoulement,"  are  used  in
international  law  to  describe  the  unacceptable  return  of an  individual  to
a  country  where  she  faces  serious  mistreatment.  They  are  commonly
associated  with  the  1951  Convention  Relating  to  the  Status  of Refugees
and  its  1967  Protocol,6  which  contain  the  particular  prohibition  of
refoulement  to  a  place  where  an  individual  faces  persecution  on one  of
the  five  Refugee  Convention  grounds!  The  two  terms  may  also  be
used,  however,  in  connection  with  other  norms  prohibiting  return  due  to
other  forms  of  anticipated  mistreatment!  This  Article  will  use  the  term
"refoulement"  in its  generic  sense,  as  well  as  in  the  technical  senses  that
particular  legal  contexts  refine  for  it.
It  will  be  useful  to  begin  by  considering  three  different  ways  of
thinking  about  obligations  not  to  engage  in  refoulement:  as  independent
human  rights,  as  remedies  for  violations  of human  rights,  and  as  rules
of state  responsibility  for violations  of human  rights.  One  may  conceive
of the  right  of  nonrefoulement  under  the  Refugee  Convention  as  a  dis-
tinct  legal  right  not  derived  from  any  other  legal  right  or  set  of rights.
To  say  that  a  refugee  fears  persecution  in  her  country  of  nationality
does not  require a  determination  that  the  country  of nationality  is  violat-
ing  a  human  right  guaranteed  by  customary  international  law  or  by  a
4.  Convention  Against  Torture  and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treat-
ment  or  Punishment,  G.A.  Res.  39/46,  39  U.N.  GAOR  Supp.  (No.  51)  at  197,  U.N.
Doc.  A/RF_S/391708  (1984),  reprinted in  23  I.L.M.  1027  (1984)  [hereinafter  Torture
Convention].
5.  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  opened for  signature
Dec.  16,  1966,  999  U.N.T.S.  171  [hereinafter  Covenant].
6.  See  Protocol  Relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees,  Jan.  31,  1967,  19  U.S.T.
6223,  606  U.N.T.S.  267  (incorporating  the  substantive  provisions  of  the  Convention,
but  making  them  applicable  to  a  broader  class  of  refugees).  The  United  States  is  a
party  to  the  Protocol,  not  to  the  original  Convention.  Id.
7.  See  Refugee  Convention,  supra note  3,  art.  33  at  176  (providing  that  "[n]o
Contracting  State  shall  expel  or  return  ("refouler") a  refugee  in  any  manner  whatsoev-
er  to  the  frontiers  of  territories  where  his  life  or  freedom  would  be  threatened  on  ac-
count  of  his  race,  religion,  nationality,  membership  of  a  particular  social  group  or
political  opinion").
8.  Torture  Convention,  supra note  4,  art.  3.
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treaty  to which  that  country  is  a party.  Indeed,  the  Refugee  Convention
came  so  early  in  the  development  of binding  international  human  rights
law  after  the  Second  World  War,9  that  few  refugees  would  have  been
protected  if that had been  a criterion.  As  an  independent  legal  right,  the
scope of the right of nonrefoulement  may  vary with  the particular instru-
ment  (or customary  rule)  under which  it  arises,  as  may  the  relationship
that  must  exist  between  an  individual  and  a  state  before  the  individual
can  assert  the  right against  that state.
Alternatively,  we  may  think  of  nonrefoulement  as  a  remedial  rule,
supplementing  the  individual's  self-help  remedy  of flight  to  escape  se-
vere  human  rights  violations  in  her  own  country.  The  inability  of refu-
gees  to obtain protection  of their rights  from  their own  country  provides
a  traditional  justification  for  assigning  a  duty  of protection  to  another
country."  The  obligation  of  a  specific  state  to  afford  that  protection
may  derive  from  a particular  instrument  like  the Refugee  Convention,  or
from  more  general  rules  concerning  the  scope  of  a state's  obligation  to
protect  human  rights.  This  approach  construes  nonrefoulement  as  an
affirmative  act by  the  state for the  individual's  benefit.
Finally,  we  may  think  of  nonrefoulement  as  a  rule  concerning  state
responsibility  for  violations  of  human  rights.  States  must  refrain  from
refoulement  in order  to  avoid  complicity  in  serious  human  rights  viola-
tions  committed  by others.  A state that  knowingly  (or with  awareness  of
sufficient  risk) compels  an  individual  to  return  to  a  country  where  her
rights  will be violated  is  not  merely  neglecting  to protect  her, but  helps
cause  the  violation.  This  approach  emphasizes  the  active  character  of
refoulement.  The  state's  obligation  to  refrain  from  refoulement  may
derive from  a particular  instrument  like the Refugee  Convention, or from
more  general  rules regarding  a state's  responsibility  for the  consequences
of its  actions.
9.  Louis  Henkin,  Introduction, in  THE  INTERNATIONAL  BILL  OF  RIGHTS:  THE
COVENANT  ON  CIVIL AND  POLITICAL  RIGHTS  6-11  (Louis  Henkin  ed.,  1981).
10.  See  JAMES  HATHAWAY,  THE  LAW  OF  REFUGEE  STATUS  124  (1991)  (explain-
ing  that  "refugee  law  is  designed  to  interpose  the  protection  of the  international  com-
munity  only  in  situations  where  there  is  no  reasonable  expectation  that  adequate  na-
tional  protection  of core  human  rights  will  be  forthcoming").  The  remedial  approach
also  informs  the  recent  "state-centered"  model  under  which  cross-border  refugee  flows
are  avoided  by  intervening  to  rectify  abuses  or  creating  in-state  protection  zones.  See
T.  Alexander  Aleinikoff,  State-centered Refugee  Law:  From  Resettlement  to  Contain-
ment,  14  MIcH.  J.  INT'L  L.  120  (1992)  (describing  and  evaluating  this  development);
Martin,  supra note  1 (same).
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These  three  aspects  of  nonrefoulement  obligations  are  not  mutually
exclusive,  and  do not  exhaust  the  conceivable  alternatives.  They  afford,
however,  varied  insights  into an  individual's  claim  on  a  state that threat-
ens  refoulement.  As  examples  will  illustrate,  the  adoption  of  one  ap-
proach  to  the  exclusion  of the  others  may  lead  to  different  conclusions
regarding  the  scope  of a  state's  duty  of nonrefoulement.
II.  HIGH  SEAS  INTERDICTION  OF  REFUGEES  AND
SALE  V. HAITIAN  CENTERS  COUNCIL, INC."
The  U.S.  Supreme  Court's  recent  decision  in  Sale  v.  Haitian Centers
Council, Inc.  highlights  the  problem  of  extraterritorial  violations  of
refugees'  rights.  In  Sale, the  Court  upheld  the  Bush-Clinton  policy  of
intercepting  boats  off the  coast  of Haiti  and  returning  their occupants  to
Haiti  without  providing  an  opportunity  for  those  occupants  to  demon-
strate  their  refugee  status,  despite  a  challenge  based  on  the  statutory
prohibition  of  refoulement  in  section  243(h)  of  the  Immigration  and
Nationality  Act. 2  The  majority  rested  its  decision  on  the  conclusion
that  neither  the  statutory  prohibition  nor  the  prohibition  of refoulement
in  the  Refugee  Convention  applied  outside  the  borders  of  the  United
States.
A.  THE  LIMITS  OF  SALE1
3
The  Sale  decision  overturned  a  Second  Circuit  ruling  that  found  the
plain language  of section  243(h) to preclude  any  geographical  limitation.
The  Supreme  Court's  contrary  interpretation  resulted  in  part  from  its
reading  of  the  legislative  history  of  section  243(h) 14  and  in  part  from
invocation  of  a  presumption  against  extraterritoriality  in  statutes."  Leg-
islative  history  provides  some  support  for  this  interpretation;  although
the Refugee  Act  of  1980,  which  gave  section  243(h)  its  current  signifi-
cance,  was  generally  intended  to  conform United  States  statutory  law  to
the  requirements  of  the  Refugee  Convention,  the  consequence  most
visibly  contemplated  was  the  extension  of the  refoulement  prohibition  to
exclusion  proceedings. 6
11.  113  S.  Ct.  2549  (1993).
12.  8  U.S.C.  §  1253(h)  (1993).
13.  The  purpose  of  the  article  is  not  to  analyze  the  Sale  decision,  but  to  sketch
it  fully  enough  to  provide  a  background  for  discussion  of  issues  it  left  unaddressed.
14.  Sale,  113  S.  Ct.  at  2560-61.
15.  Id. at  2560,  2567.
16.  See  id.  at  2561,  n.33  (citing  House  and  Senate  Reports).  Exclusion  is  the
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The  reliance  on  a  presumption  against  the  extraterritorial  application
of statutes,  however, was  more dubious.  The Immigration  and  Nationali-
ty  Act  affords  a  peculiar  occasion  for  invoking  this  presumption-its
very  purpose  is  to  regulate  cross-border  movement  of aliens,  and  it gov-
erns  the  activities  of an  agency  with  both  domestic  and  overseas  offic-
es.' 7  In  fact,  the  majority  proved  glaringly  inconsistent  in  its  treatment
of the presumption  against extraterritoriality,  drawing  upon  it to limit  the
scope  of the refoulement  prohibition  of section  243(h),  but never  bring-
ing it to bear  on section  212(f)  of the  same  Act," 8  the  supposed  statuto-
ry  basis  for  the  president's  establishment  of the  extraterritorial  interdic-
tion  program.'  This  broad  reading  of  a  provision  which  granted  the
executive  branch  power  over  immigration  was  hardly  unusual.  Several
weeks  after  the  Court's  decision,  a  unanimous  Ninth  Circuit  panel  up-
held  the  authority  of the  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service  (INS)
to  conduct  law  enforcement  activities  on  the  high  seas  on  the  basis  of
the  extraterritorial  nature  of  the  immigration  laws,  without  mentioning
either  the  Sale  decision  or  the  presumption  against  extraterritoriality."
process  for  denying  aliens  entry  into  the  United  States,  as  opposed  to  deportation,
which  is  the  process  for expelling  aliens  who  have  already  entered.
17.  Id.  at  2576-77  (Blackmun,  I.,  dissenting);  see  8  C.F.R.  §  100.4  (1993)  (listing
INS  offices  in  Athens,  Bangkok,  Calgary,  Frankfurt,  Freeport,  Guadalajara,  Hamilton.
Hong  Kong,  Manila,  Mexico  City,  Monterrey,  Montevideo.  Montreal,  Naples,  Nassau,
Ottawa,  Palermo,  Rome,  Seoul,  Singapore,  Toronto,  Vancouver,  Victoria,  Vienna,  and
Winnipeg).
18.  8  U.S.C.  §  1182(f)  (1993).
19.  Sale,  113  S. C.  at  2559,  2567.  Finding  authority  for  high  seas  interdiction  in
§ 212(0  was,  as  Justice  Blackmun  mildly  put  it.  "somewhat  of a  stretch."  Id. at  2573
n.9  (Blackmun,  J.,  dissenting).  It  is  obvious  from  the  structure  of the  statute  that  the
purpose  of § 212(f),  which  authorizes  the  President  to  "suspend  the  entry  of all  aliens
or  any  class  of  aliens  as  immigrants  or  nonimmigrants,  or  impose  on  the  entry  of
aliens  any  restrictions  he  may  deem  appropriate,"  is  to  empower  the  President  to
make  temporary  additions  (absolute  or  conditional)  to  the  list  of statutory  grounds  of
exclusion  from  the  United  States  contained  in  §  212.  With  the  single  exception  of
Haitian  interdiction,  that  is  the  only  purpose  for  which  § 212(0  has  ever  been  used.
Proposed Interdiction of Haitian Flag  Vessels,  5  Op.  Off.  Legal  Counsel  242,  244
(1981)  (stating  that  § 212(f)  has  not  been  used  since  its  enactment  until  1981);  Proc-
lamation  No.  6636,  58  Fed.  Reg.  65,525  (1993);  Proclamation  No.  6574,  58  Fed.  Reg.
34,209  (1993);  Proclamation  No.  6569,  58  Fed.  Reg.  31,897  (1993);  Proclamation  No.
5887,  53  Fed.  Reg.  43,185  (1988);  Proclamation  No.  5829,  53  Fed.  Reg.  22,289
(1988);  Proclamation  No.  5517,  51  Fed.  Reg.  30,470  (1986);  Proclamation  No.  5377,
50  Fed.  Reg.  41,329  (1985).
20.  United  States  v.  Chen,  2  F.3d  330,  333-34  (9th  Cir.  1993),  cert. denied,  114
S.Ct.  1558  (1994);  see  also  United  States  v.  Aguilar,  883  F.2d  662,  692  (9th  Cir.
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Although  the  Supreme  Court  stated  in  Sale  that  the  "presumption  has
special  force  when  we  are construing  treaty  and  statutory  provisions  that
may  involve  foreign  and  military  affairs  for  which  the  President  has
unique  responsibility,"'"  it  seemed  really  to  be  saying  that  grants  of
power  to  the  president  are  presumptively  extraterritorial,  while  limita-
tions  on  his  power  are  presumptively  not.  Nothing  in  the  Supreme
Court's  recent  case  law  emphasizing  a  presumption  against  extraterri-
toriality  has justified  a distinction  between  statutes  granting  the  govern-
ment power  and  statutes  limiting  government  power.  Indeed,  the  current
vogue for the  presumption  originated  in  EEOC v.  Arabian American  Oil
Co.,'2  which  rejected  the  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Commission's
efforts  to  apply  federal  anti-discrimination  laws  to  a  U.S.  corporation's
treatment  of its U.S.  employees  abroad.'
The  Court also  checked  its  interpretation  of section  243(h)  against  the
prohibition  of refoulement  in the  Refugee Convention.  Upon  examination
of  the  negotiating  history  of  the  1951  Convention,  the  Court  claimed
that  it  found  affirmative  evidence  that  Article  33  was  not  intended  to
apply  extraterritorially. 24  The  travaux preparatoires contain  a  discus-
sion,  of  ambiguous  significance,'  which  actually  relates  to  a  different
issue,  whether  the  prohibition  of  refoulement  includes  a  prohibition  of
rejection  at the frontier  (i.e.,  an  obligation to admit refugees).  The  Court
somehow  found  a  territorially  limited  meaning  inherent  in  the  French
verb  "refouler,"26  and  bolstered  this  interpretation  with  citations  to  early
commentators  on  the  Refugee  Convention. 7  The  Court  added:  "A  more
1989),  (upholding  extraterritoriality  of  criminal  immigration  statutes)  cert. denied, 498
U.S.  1046  (1991).
21.  Sale,  113  S.  Ct.  at  2567.
22.  EEOC  v.  Arabian  American  Oil  Co.,  499  U.S.  244  (1991).
23.  This  is  not  to  say  that  one  cannot  divine  an  unexplained  preference  for  un-
fettered  executive  power  behind  a  body  of  case  law  that  refuses  extraterritorial  appli-
cation  to  statutes  creating  private  causes  of  action, judicial  jurisdiction  over  civil  cas-
es,  and  limitations  on  executive  power,  and  permits  extraterritorial  application  of crim-
inal  statutes  and  statutes  granting  executive  power.
24.  Sale,  113  S.  Ct.  at  2565-67.
25.  See  id. at  2567  (noting  that  "the  significance  of  the  President's  comment  that
the  remarks  should  be  'placed  on  record'  is  not  entirely  clear");  id.  at  2571-72
(Blackmun,  J.,  dissenting)  (arguing  that  the  record  merely  documented  views  of  indi-
vidual  delegates).
26.  Id. at  2563-64.
27.  Id.  at  2564  nA0  (citing  N.  ROBINSON,  CONVENTION  RELATING  TO  THE  STA-
TUS  OF  REFUGEES:  ITS  HISTORY,  CONTENT  AND  INTERPRETATION  162-63  (1953),  and
A.  GRAHL-MADSEN,  THE  STATUS  OF  REFUGEE  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  94  (1972)).EXTRATERRITORIAL  VIOLATIONS
recent  work  describes  the  evolution  of non-refoulement  into the  interna-
tional  (and  possibly  extraterritorial)  duty  of  non-return  relied  upon  by
respondents,  but it also  admits  that  in  1951  non-refoulement  had  a  nar-
rower meaning  and  did not  encompass  extraterritorial  obligations."'
B.  BEYOND  SALE
While  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  interdiction  program  in  Sale, it
did not  provide  an  unqualified  endorsement.  Justice Stevens,  who  wrote
the  majority  opinion,  included  some  passages  that  other Justices  might
have  omitted.  He conceded  the "moral  weight" of the argument  "that the
Protocol's  broad  remedial  goals  require  that  a  nation  be  prevented  from
repatriating  refugees  to  their  potential  oppressors  whether  or  not  the
refugees  are  within  that nation's  borders."'  He  observed:
The  drafters  of the  Convention  and  the  parties  to  the  Protocol-like  the
drafters  of § 243(h)-may  not  have  contemplated  that  any  nation  would
gather  fleeing refugees  and return  them  to  the one  country  they  had  des-
perately  sought  to  escape;  such  actions  may  even  violate  the  spirit  of
Article  33; but a treaty  cannot impose  uncontemplated  extraterritorial  obli-
gations  on those  who  ratify  it  through  no  more  than  its  general  humani-
tarian  intent.'
He  concluded  the  opinion by quoting  Judge  Harry  Edwards'  comment
on  an  earlier  phase  of  the  Haitian  interdiction  controversy:  "Although
the human  crisis  is  compelling,  there  is  no  solution  to  be  found  in  a
judicial  remedy."3
Thus,  the  Court's  argument  in  Sale  appears  to  be  technical  and
positivistic,  rather  than  a justification  of  the  interdiction  program.  The
Court focused on nonrefoulement  as  a particular  prohibition embodied  in
the  1951  Refugee  Convention.  It  concluded  that  the drafters  of the  Con-
vention  had  neglected  to prohibit  schemes  like high  seas  interdiction.  As
a  result,  a  court  could  not  find  interdiction  to  be  a  violation  of  the
United  States'  obligations  under  the  Protocol.  If one  accepts  this  inter-
28.  Sale,  113  S.  Ct.  at  2564  n.40  (citing  G.  GOOD\VIN-GILL,  THE  REFuEE  IN
INTERNATIONAL  LAW  74-76  (1983)).
29.  Sale,  113  S.  Ct.  at  2563.
30.  Id. at  2565.
31.  Id.  at  2567  (quoting  Haitian  Refugee  Center  v.  Gracey,  809  F.2d  794,  841
(D.C.  Cir.  1987)  (Edwards,  J.,  concurring)).
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pretation  of  the  Convention,32  then  a  gap  appears  in  international  refu-
gee  law  that  may  need  to  be  filled from  sources  outside  the Convention.
Actually,  the  Court's  decision  does  not  necessitate  the  existence  of a
gap;  it  only  determines  that  the  Convention  and  federal  statutes  imple-
menting  the  Convention  do  not  cover  high  seas  interdiction.  The  1951
Refugee  Convention  and  its  1967  Protocol  are  not the  only  international
law  sources  of nonrefoulement  obligations. The  decision  leaves  open  the
compatibility  of interdiction  with  other  sources of law, including  custom-
ary  international  law33  and  other  treaties  to  which  the  United  States
may  be  a  party.  This  article  discusses  two  examples  of  other  human
rights  treaties  that  impose  nonrefoulement  obligations:  the  United  Na-
tions  Convention  Against  Torture  and  the  International  Covenant  on
Civil  and  Political  Rights.'
III.  NONREFOULEMENT  AND THE  TORTURE  CONVENTION
The  Torture  Convention  establishes  mechanisms  designed  "to  make
more  effective  the  struggle  against  torture  and  cruel,  inhuman  or degrad-
ing  treatment  or  punishment  throughout  the  world." 35  It  includes,  inter
alia, requirements  that  states prevent  their  agents  from  inflicting  torture,
32.  But  see  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  Responds  to  U.S.  Supreme
Court  Decision  in  Sale  v.  Haitian  Centers  Council,  32  I.L.M.  1215  (1993)  (stating
that  "the  obligation  not  to  return  refugees  to  persecution  arises  irrespective  of  whether
governments  are  acting  within  or  outside  their  borders.  . . .UNHCR  considers  the
Court's  decision  a  setback  to  modern  international  refugee  law ..  ").
33.  The  plaintiffs  in  Sale,  who  were  challenging  an  Executive  Order  that  dis-
pensed  with  the  requirement  of  inquiries  into  refugee  status  before  repatriation  to
Haiti,  did  not  ask  the  Court  to  find  that  the  President  was  acting  in  violation  of
customary  international  law,  presumably  because  they  expected  that  the  Court  would
find  that  the  Executive  Order  was  a  "controlling  executive  act"  precluding  judicial
enforcement  of  customary  law  within  the  meaning  of  The  Paquete Habana, 175  U.S.
677  (1900).  See  Restatement  (Third)  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Law  of  the  United
States  §  115,  Reporters'  Note  3  (1987)  (stating  that  various  Supreme  Court  statements
suggest  that  courts  will  not  compel  the  President  to  comply  with  international  law);
Agora,  May  the  President Violate  Customary International Law?,  80  AM.  J.  INT'L  L.
913  (1986)  (debating  the  extent  of  the  President's  power  under  this  doctrine).
34.  This  article  will  not  discuss  the  implications  of  the  Inter-American  human
rights  system  for  U.S.  nonrefoulement  obligations.  For  an  introduction  to  that  system,
see  Thomas  Buergenthal,  The  Inter-American  System  for  the  Protection of  Human
Rights,  in  HUMAN  RIGHTS  IN INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  LEGAL  AND  POLICY  IssUEs  439
(Theodor  Meron  ed.,  1985).
35.  Torture  Convention,  supra note  4,  pmbl.
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educate  them  in  their  obligations,  investigate  incidents  of  torture,  com-
pensate  victims  of torture,  and  prosecute  perpetrators  of torture.'
The  Torture  Convention  includes  an  explicit  prohibition  of the return
of aliens  to  countries  where  they  face  torture.  Article  3(1)  provides  that
"[n]o  State Party  shall  expel, return  ("refouler")  or extradite  a person  to
another  State  where  there  are  substantial  grounds  for  believing  that  he
would  be  in  danger  of  being  subject  to  torture."'  This  prohibition
shares  some  common  ground  with,  but  is  independent  of,  the
refoulement  prohibition  of the Refugee  Convention.  Not every  refugee  is
fleeing  from  the  prospect  of  torture,  and  not  every  person  threatened
with  torture  is  a "refugee"  within  the  meaning  of the  1967  Protocol.
In fact,  the Torture  Convention  specifically  defines  "torture,"  and  its
operative  meaning  includes  an  element  of  official  action  not  normally
present  in  the definition  of torture.  Article  I  defines  the  term,  for  pur-
poses  of the Convention  only,"  as:
[A]ny  act by  which  severe  pain  or  suffering,  whether  physical  or mental,
is  intentionally  inflicted  on  a person  for  such  purposes  as  obtaining  from
him  or  a third  person  information  or  a  confession,  punishing  him  for an
act  he  or a third  person has  committed  or  is suspected of having  commit-
ted,  or  intimidating  or  coercing  him  or  a  third  person,  or  for  any  reason
based  on  discrimination  of any  kind,  when  such  pain  or  suffering  is  in-
flicted  by  or at the instigation  of or with  the consent or  acquiescence  of a
public  official  or  other  person  acting  in  an  official  capacity.  It  does  not
36.  See  J.  HERmaN  BURGERS  &  HANS  DANEuUS,  THE  UNrrED  NATIONS  CON-
VENTION  AGAINST  TORTURE:  A  HANDBOOK  ON  THE  CONVENTION  AGAINST  TORTURE
AND  OTHER  CRUEL,  INHUMAN  OR  DEGRADING  TREATMENT  OR  PuNIsHMENT  2-3
(1988)  (summarizing  the  substantive  provisions  of the  Torture  Convention).
37.  Torture  Convention,  supra note  4,  art.  3.  Of  course,  this  protection  is  not
limited  to  aliens,  but  for reasons  of context  I  will  emphasize  this  aspect  of the  prohi-
bition.
Although  the  Torture  Convention  includes  provisions  requiring  protection  against
other  forms  of "cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment."  these  do  not
include  a  nonrefoulement  obligation  relative  to  such  treatment  or  punishment.  Id.  art.
16(1).  The  Convention  does  not,  however,  purport  to  contradict  nonrefoulement  obliga-
tions  arising  under  other  sources  of law.  ld.  art.  16(2);  see  BURGERS  &  DANELIUS,
supra note  36,  at  149-50  (noting  that  the  protection  of other  international  instruments
on  the  issue  of extradition  will not  be  affected  by  the  Convention).
38.  See  Torture  Convention,  supra note  4, art.  1(2)  (clarifying  that  the  definition
of  "torture"  is  not  intended  to  prejudice  the  use  of  other  definitions  in other  con-
texts).  The  linkage  between  torture  and  government  action  in the  Torture  Convention
further  narrows  the  definition.  See  BURGERS  & DANELiUS,  supra note  36,  at  119-20
(explaining  that  this  choice  was  made  because  the  mechanisms  of  the  Convention
were  considered  unnecessary  for the  suppression  of  private  torture).
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include  pain  or  suffering  arising  only  from,  inherent  in,  or  incidental  to
lawful  sanctions. 39
Most  importantly,  the  definition  is  not  limited  to  torture  inflicted  on
grounds  of race,  religion,  nationality,  membership  in  a  particular  social
group,  or  political  opinion.  Accordingly,  an  alien's  rights  under  the
Torture  Convention  do  not  depend  on  whether  the  alien  is  also  a  refu-
gee,  or  on a  characterization  of the  torture  as  a  form of "persecution."
Thus,  the  Torture Convention  does  not invite  the kind  of hair-splitting
over  the  torturer's  motive  that  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  in  LN.S.  v.
Elias-Zacarias 0  has  encouraged  in  the  implementation  of  the  United
States  refugee  laws,  and  that  the  Board  of Immigration  Appeals  (BIA)
has  practiced  in  a  series  of recent  cases  involving  Sikhs  from  India.4
When  the  United  States  becomes  a  party  to  the  Torture  Convention,
Article  3  will  forbid  the  BIA  to  tell  an  alien,  "Sure  you're  going  to  be
tortured,  but  you're  not  going  to  be  tortured  on  grounds  of  political
opinion,  so  we'll  send  you  back."42
As  of this  writing,  the  United  States  has  not  yet  ratified  the  Torture
Convention.  The  Senate gave  its consent  to  ratification  in  October  1990,
but  it  postponed  ratification  until  the  passage  of the  criminal  legislation
needed  to  implement  the  Convention.43  Congress  finally  enacted  the
39.  Torture  Convention,  supra  note  4,  art.  1(1);  see  infra  note  47  and  accom-
panying  text  (noting  that  the  U.S.  modification  of this  definition).  The  exception  for
"lawful  sanctions"  is  somewhat  confusing.  BURGERS  &  DANELIUS,  supra  note  37,  at
121-22.  The  United  States,  in  the  reservations,  understandings,  and  declarations  that
the  Senate  attached  to  its  consent  to  the  Convention,  takes  the  position  that  this  sen-
tence  does  not  provide  a  loophole  through  which  a  State  Party  could  eviscerate  the
Convention.  See  136  CONG.  REC.  S17,491  (daily  ed.  Oct.  27,  1990)  (Understanding
No.  l(c))  (asserting  that  a  State  Party  could  not  defeat  the  object  and  purpose  of  the
Convention  through  its  domestic  sanctions).
40.  112  S.  Ct.  812,  816  (1992)  (upholding  a  BIA  decision  that  a  guerilla's  threat
to  kill  represented  an  effort  to  coerce  enlistment  rather  than  punishment  for  political
opposition).
41.  Matter  of  R-,  Int. Dec.  No.  3195  (BIA  Dec.  15,  1992),  remanded  sub  nom.
Rana  v.  Moshorak,  No.  CV  93-0274-SVW  (C.D.  Cal.  July  15,  1993);  Matter  of K-  S-
,  Int. Dec.  No.  3209  (BIA  Oct.  5,  1993);  Chamjit  Singh  v.  lchert,  No.  C-93-2086-
MHP,  1993  U.S.  Dist.  Lexis  16992  (N.D.  Cal.  Nov.  15,  1993);  Harpinder  Singh  v.
llchert,  1993  U.S.  Dist.  Lexis  16975  (N.D.  Cal.  Nov.  15,  1993).
42.  Actually,  one  does  not have  to  wait  for ratification  of the  Torture  Convention
for  this  prohibition  to  take  effect;  such  conduct  is  already  a  violation  of  Article  7  of
the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights.  See  infra  text  accompanying
notes  68-69.
43.  See  David  P.  Stewart,  The  Torture  Convention  and the Reception  of Interna-EXTRATERRITORIAL  VIOLATIONS
implementing  legislation  in  April  1994,'  but  President  Clinton  has  not
yet deposited  the  instrument  of  ratification."  Ratification  is  presumably
only  a matter  of time.
The  Senate's  consent  to  ratification  included  a  series  of reservations,
understandings  and  declarations,  most  of  which  the  administration  pro-
posed, that modify  or clarify  U.S.  obligations  under  the  Torture  Conven-
tion.4'  For example,  the understandings  specify  more  fully  the  definition
of  torture 7  More  significantly  for  our  purposes,  one  understanding43
equates  the "substantial  grounds  for believing"  standard  of article  3 with
the  "more  likely  than  not"  standard  derived  from  the  Supreme  Court's
decision  in  INS v.  Stevic 9  This  elevation  of the  burden  of proof  repre-
sents  the  United  States'  only  effort  to  limit  its  nonrefoulement  obliga-
tions  under the Torture Convention.
Final  ratification  of the  Convention  will  therefore  require  broadening
the  practice  of avoiding  deportation  in  cases  involving  probable  torture.
This  requirement,  however,  may  not  be  judicially  enforceable  as  such.
No  legislation  implementing  nonrefoulement  is  contemplated,  and  the
Senate  has  declared  that  substantive  provisions  of  the  Torture  Conven-
tion  are  non-self-executing.'  Nonetheless,  the  United  States  will  be
tional Criminal Law  within  the  United  States.  15  NOVA  L.  Ray.  449,  450  &  n.4
(1991)  (explaining  that  ratification  of  the  Torture  Convention  requires  implementing
legislation)  [hereinafter  Stewart,  Torture Convention].
44.  See  Pub.  L.  No.  103-236,  § 506,  108  Stat.  463  (adding  18  U.S.C.  §§  2340-
2340B).
45.  Id.
46.  See  136  CONG.  REc.  S17,486-87  (daily  ed.  Oct.  27,  1990)  (statement  of Sen.
Pell)  (noting  that  the  Senate  received  the  Torture  Convention  with  conditions  attached
by  the  Reagan  and  Bush  Administrations).  I  will  not  enter  here  into  the  question  of
whether  these  are  all  valid  reservations,  or  whether  some  of them  are  invalid  due  to
their  incompatibility  with  the  object  and  purpose  of the  Convention.
47.  136  CONG.  REc.  S17,491-92  (daily  ed.  Oct.  27,  1990)  (Understandings  Nos.
1(a)-(e));  Stewart, supra note  43,  at  455-56  (explaining  the  purpose  of the  Understand-
ings).
48.  136  CONG.  REc.  S17,492  (daily  ed.  Oct.  27,  1990)  (Understanding  No.  2);
see  Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before  the  Senate  Comm.  on  Foreign Rela-
tions,  101st  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  18  (1990)  (testimony  of  Mark  Richard,  Deputy  Assistant
Attorney  General  for  the  Criminal  Division)  [hereinafter  Richard  Testimony]  (explain-
ing  the  administration's  rationale  for  modifying  the  burden  of proof);  Stewart,  Torture
Convention, supra note  43,  at  457-58  (same).
49.  467  U.S.  407,  429-30  (1984)  (holding  that  an  alien  must  show  that  persecu-
tion  is  more  likely  than  not  in  order  to  be  protected  from  refoulement  under  § 243(h)
of the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act).
50.  See  Stewart,  Torture  Convention,  supra  note  43,  at  467-68  (discussing  the
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obligated  to  comply  with  Article  3, and  responsibility  for compliance  in
the  immigration  context  will  fall  to  the  Attorney  General  and  her  dele-
gates."  The  Attorney  General  has  a  variety  of discretionary  tools  avail-
able  that  she  can  use  to  avoid  sending  aliens  back  to  a  country  where
torture  is  likely,  including  parole,52  prosecutorial  discretion,  deferred
enforced  departure,53  and  (in  some  cases)  suspension  of  deportation.54
Different  subordinates  within  the  Justice  Department,  however,  possess
delegated  authority  to  wield  these  various  tools.5  Once  the  United
States  ratifies  the  Torture  Convention,  it  would be  advisable  for  the  At-
torney  General  to  issue  regulations  clarifying  how  existing  discretion
will  be  used to comply  with  Article  3.
Whether  the  nonrefoulement  obligation  of the  Torture  Convention  has
a broader  territorial  scope  than  that  attributed  to the  Refugee  Convention
by the Supreme  Court presents  a difficult  question.  The Torture  Conven-
tion  was  opened  for  signature  in  December  1984.56  The  Supreme  Court
decision  to  declare  the  Convention  non-self-executing).  I  assume  arguendo  that  the
declaration  can  suffice  to  make  the  treaty  non-self-executing.  But  see  Lori  Fisler
Damrosch,  The  Role  of  the  United States  Senate  Concerning  "Self-Executing"  and
"Non-Self-Executing"  Treaties, 67  CHI.-KENT  L.  REV.  515,  527  (1991)  (arguing  that
the  Senate  cannot  defeat  the  self-executing  character  of  a  treaty  provision  without  ade-
quate  reason);  Stefan  A.  Riesenfeld  &  Frederick  M.  Abbott,  The  Scope  of U.S. Senate
Control over the  Conclusion and  Operation of  Treaties, 67  CHI.-KENT  L.  REV.  571,
631-32  (1991)  (denying  any  binding  character  of  the  declaration  that  the  Torture  Con-
vention  is  not  self-executing).
51.  See  Richard  Testimony,  supra note  48,  at  15  (explaining  that  "Article  3  plac-
es  an  obligation  upon  the  competent  authorities  of  the  United  States  not  to  deliver  an
individual  to  a  country  where  he  would  be  tortured.  Under  existing  law,  the  compe-
tent  authorities  for  ensuring  the  execution  of  this  obligation  are  the  Secretary  of  State
for  extradition  and  the  Attorney  General  for  deportation").
52.  Parole  enables  the  Attorney  General  to  permit  an  alien  who  has  not  yet  "en-
tered"  the  country  in  legal  terms  to  enter  the  country  physically.  8  U.S.C.  §
I182(d)(5)(A)  (Supp.  V  1993).
53.  See  T.  ALEXANDER  ALEINIKOFF  &  DAVID  A.  MARTIN,  IMMIGRATION:  PRO-
CESS  AND  POLICY  610-14,  844  (2d  ed.  1991)  (characterizing  prosecutorial  discretion
and  deferred  enforced  departure  as  administrative  tools  for  postponing,  possibly  forev-
er,  the  removal  of  an  alien  who  has  already  legally  entered).
54.  See  8  U.S.C.  §  1254(a)(1)  (1988)  (permitting  the  suspension  of  deportation  as
a  procedure  for  granting  permanent  residence  status  to  aliens  who  have  been  in  the
country  for  more  than  seven  years  and  who  would  face  "extreme  hardship"  if  deport-
ed).
55.  See  8  C.F.R.  §  212.5(a)  (1993)  (authorizing  INS  district  directors  to  grant
parole);  8  C.F.R.  §§  244.1,  3.1(b)(2)  (1993)  (authorizing  immigration  judges  and  the
Board  of  Immigration  Appeals  to  suspend  deportation).
56.  Torture  Convention,  supra note  4,  at  197.EXTRATERRITORIAL  VIOLATIONS
has  recognized  that the  concept  of refoulement  may  have  come  to  em-
brace  extraterritorial  action  by  that  dateY  As  one  commentary  on  the
Torture  Convention  explains,  Article  3  "is  intended  to  cover  all  mea-
sures  by  which  a  person  is  physically  transferred  to  another  State."Ss
Because  a jus cogens  norm  of  customary  international  law  binding  on
all  states  already  prohibits  state-condoned  torture,"  law-abiding  states
have  particularly  strong  reason  to  avoid  complicity  in  other  states'  tor-
ture practices.  On  the other  hand,  the language  of Article  3  of the Tor-
ture Convention  says  only  "expel,  return  ('refouler')  or extradite,"  offer-
ing  a parallel  to  the wording  "expel  or return  ('refouler')"  in  Article  33
of  the  Refugee  Convention.'  Some  commentators  have  suggested  that
the drafters  of the Torture  Convention  used the  term  "refouler"  in  order
to avoid  resolving  disagreements  over  the scope  of the  obligation.6'
Uncertainty  about  the  scope  of  the  nonrefoulement  obligation  under
the  Torture Convention  may  yet be  clarified  by international  institutions.
Article  17  of the  Torture  Convention  creates  a Committee  Against Tor-
ture,  to  which  State  Parties  are  obliged  to  report  periodically.'  The
Committee  also  has  nonmandatory  competence  to  consider  complaints  of
57.  See  Sale,  113  S.  Ct.  at  2564-65,  n.40  (citing  G.  GOODW1IN-GILL,  THE  REF-
UGEE  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAw  74-76  (1983))  (addressing  the  evolution  of  non-
refoulement  into  an  extraterritorial  obligation).
58.  BURGERS  &  DANEUUS,  supra note  36,  at  126.
59.  See RESTATmMNT  (THIRD)  OF  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  OF  THE  UNrrED
STATES,  §  702  and  cmt.  n  (1987)  (identifying  torture  as  a  violation  of a jus  cogens
norm  and  explaining  the  consequences);  BURGERS  &  DANELIUS,  supra note  36,  at  I
(stating  that  the  Torture  Convention  "is  based  upon  the  recognition  that  the  above-
mentioned  practices  are  already  outlawed  under  international  law").
60.  See  BURGERS  &  DANEI.US,  supra  note  36.  at  126  (describing  Article  33  of
the  Refugee  Convention  as  a  source  of  inspiration).  Unlike  Article  33  of the  Refugee
Convention,  however,  Article  3  of  the  Torture  Convention  has  no  exception  clause
making  reference  to  an  alien's  posing  "danger  to  the  security  of the  country  in  which
he  is,"  a  factor  that the  Sale  majority  considered  relevant  to  determining  the  territorial
scope  of the  refoulement  prohibition  under  that  Convention.  Sale,  113  S.  Ct.  at  2563.
But  see  Sale,  113  S.  Ct.  at  2570  (Blackmun,  J.,  dissenting)  (discounting  this  argu-
ment).
61.  Kay  Hailbronner  &  Albrecht  Randelzhofer,  Zur  Zeichnung  der  UN-
Folterkonvention  durch  die  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland,  1986  EUROPAISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE-ZErrSCHRIFT  641,  643  (1986).  These  authors  were,  however,  discussing
the  question  of rejection  at  the  frontier,  not  the  question  of  return  of  refugees  cap-
tured  on  the  high  seas.
62.  Torture  Convention,  supra note  4,  art.  19;  see  BURGERS  &  DANE.IUS,  supra
note  36,  at  156-59  (describing  the  responsibilities  of  State  Parties  to  the  Committee
under  Article  19).
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Convention  violations  filed  by  other  State  Parties  or  by  individual  vic-
tims,  and  to  investigate  on  its  own  motion  indications  that  torture  is
being  systematically  practiced  in  the  territory  of  a  State  Party.6 3  Al-
though  the  United  States  plans  to  accept  the  competence  of  the  Com-
mittee  to receive  complaints  from  other  State  Parties  (which  are  unlike-
ly)'  and  to  investigate  reports  of systematic  torture,  it  does  not  intend
to  accept  the  competence  of the  Committee  to receive  complaints  from
individual  victims.65  Thus,  guidance  from  the  Committee  Against  Tor-
ture  regarding  the  territorial  scope  of  the  nonrefoulement  obligation
under  Article  3  is  more  likely  to  arise  in  the  course  of  the  reporting
procedure  or  in  connection  with  complaints  brought  against  other  signa-
tories  rather  than  in  connection  with  a  specific  complaint  against  the
United  States.
IV.  NONREFOULEMENT  AND  THE  INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT  ON  CIVIL AND  POLITICAL  RIGHTS
The  United  States  became  a  party  to  the  International  Covenant  on
Civil  and  Political  Rights  in  1992.  The  Covenant  is  a  binding  interna-
tional  agreement,  designed  to  ensure  the  observance  of  traditional  civil
and  political  rights  like  life,  liberty,  physical  integrity,  privacy,  equality
before  the  law,  and  freedom  of thought,  conscience  and  expression,  as
63.  Torture  Convention,  supra  note  4,  arts.  20,  21,  22,  28.  See  BURGERS  &
DANELIUS,  supra note  36,  at  159-67  (elaborating  on  the  authority  given  to  the  Com-
mittee  Against  Torture  under  Articles  20,  21,  22,  and  28).
64.  See  Committee  on  International  Human  Rights,  The  Convention Against  Tor-
ture  and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading Treatment  or  Punishment,  42  REC.
ASS'N  BAR  CITY  N.Y.  235,  248-49  (1987)  (noting  that  State  Parties  are  reluctant  to
file  complaints  under  other  human  rights  treaties).
65.  See  136  CONG.  REc.  S17,492  (daily  ed.  Oct.  27,  1990)  (Declaration  No.  2)
(recognizing  the  competence  of  the  Committee  Against  Torture  under  Article  21  for
complaints  made  by  a  State  Party,  but  not  by  individual  victims);  Stewart,  Torture
Convention, supra note  43,  at  469-70  (explaining  that  the  United  States  will  not  rec-
ognize  the  competence  of  the  Committee  to  receive  individual  complaints).  The  accep-
tance  of  the  Article  20  procedure  for  investigation  on  the  Committee's  own  motion
will  follow  from  the  absence  of  a  declaration  under  Article  28  of  the  Torture  Con-
vention.  See  id.  at  469  &  n.47  (explaining  the  effect  of  Articles  20  and  28).  The
United  States  will  also  decline  to  be  bound  by  the  Article  30(1)  dispute  resolution
procedures  of the  Convention,  involving  compulsory  arbitration  and jurisdiction  of  the
International  Court  of  Justice  over  disputes  between  State  Parties.  136  CONG.  REC.
S17,491  (daily  ed.  Oct.  27,  1990)  (Reservation  No.  2);  see  Stewart,  Torture Conven-
tion,  supra  note  43,  at  470  (stating  that  the  United  States  reserves  its  right  not  to
follow  dispute  resolution  procedures).
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well  as  the  right  of  citizens  to  political  participation.'  Understanding
the  implications  of  the  Covenant  for  refoulement  practices  requires  a
lengthier  series  of steps.
The  Covenant  contains  no  right  of  asylum  or  prohibition  of
refoulement in express  terms.  Rather,  specific  nonrefoulement  obligations
arise in  connection  with  specific  human  rights  that  would  be  violated  by
the return  of an  alien to  a country  where  those rights  would be  violated.
Such  obligations  have  been  recognized  particularly  in  connection  with
the right  to  life  (article  6)'  and  the  right  not  to be  subjected  to torture
or to  cruel,  inhuman  or degrading  treatment  or punishment  (article  7).
Thus  a  paradox  emerging  from  the  nonrefoulement  system  of the  Tor-
ture  Convention-that  an  alien  may  be  protected  against  return  to  the
hands  of  a  torturer,  but  not  against  return  to  the  hands  of  an  assas-
sin-is obviated  under  the Covenant.
A.  THE  EXTRATERRITORIALITY  OF OBLIGATIONS
UNDER  THE  COVENANT
The  basic  obligation  imposed  on parties  to  the  Covenant  is  expressed
in  article 2(1)  as  follows:
Each  State  Party  to  the  present  Covenant  undertakes  to  respect  and  to
ensure  to  all  individuals  within  its territory and subject  to its jurisdiction
the  rights  recognized  in  the  present  Covenant,  without distinction  of any
kind,  such  as  race,  colour,  sex,  language,  religion,  political  or other  opin-
ion,  national  or social  origin,  property,  birth  or other  status!6
The  question  thus  arises  how  one  should  interpret  the  dual  phrasing
"all  individuals  within  its  territory  and  subject  to  its  jurisdiction."  Are
these  separate  and  cumulative  requirements,  meaning  that a  state  under-
takes  no  obligations  to  respect  human  rights  of  individuals  who  are
outside  its  territory?"  Are  they  alternatives  equivalent  to  "all  individ-
uals  within  its  territory  and  all  individuals  otherwise  subject  to  its ju-
66.  Henkin,  supra note  9,  at  16-21.
67.  See  Covenant,  supra note  5,  art.  6  (providing  that  "[elvery human  being  has
the  inherent  right  to  life.  This  right  shall  be  protected  by  law.  No  one  shall  be
arbitrarily  deprived  of his  life.").
68.  See  id.  art.  7  (providing  that  "[n]o  one  shall  be  subjected  to  torture  or  to
cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment").
69.  d art. 2(1)  (emphasis  added).
70.  See  Egon  Schwelb,  Civil and Political Rights:  The  International Measures of
Implementation,  62  AM.  J.  INT'L  L.  827,  863  (1968)  (adopting  this  interpretation
without  much  analysis).
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risdiction"?'  Does  the  language  express  some  other  combination  of
these  two jurisdictional  bases?
The  drafting  history  of the  Covenant  suggests  that  the  dual  phrasing
arose  as  a result of the  dual  obligation  earlier in  the  sentence  "to  respect
and  to  ensure"  the  enumerated  rights.'  The  obligation  to  "ensure"
rights  under  the  Covenant  means  more  than  just  an  obligation  not  to
violate  those  rights,  but  rather  entails  an  obligation  to  protect  those
rights  from  violations  by  third  parties."  The  drafters  added  the  phrase
"within  its territory"  to  avoid  assigning  to  states the  task of affirmatively
protecting  persons  (e.g.,  their  own  nationals)  who  might  be  subject  to
their  jurisdiction  but  who  were  in  the  territory  of  another  state.'  That
purpose  is  consistent  with  obliging  states  themselves  not  to  violate  the
rights  of  persons  subject  to  their  jurisdiction  but  outside  their  territo-
ry.
75
This  extraterritorial  reading  of obligations  under  the  Covenant  became
well-established  in  the  case  law  of  the  Human  Rights  Committee  long
before  the  U.S.  accession  to  the  Covenant."  Two  sets  of  cases,  all  in-
volving Uruguay,  illustrate this  interpretation.  The  first consists  of "pass-
port  cases,"  where  the  state  refuses  to  renew  the  passports  of perceived
political  opponents  who  are  outside  its  territory  in  order  to  impair  the
opponents'  ability  to  return  to  their  own  country  or  to  travel  freely
abroad.77  The  Human  Rights  Committee  observed  that  the  rights  to
71.  See  Thomas  Buergenthal,  To  Respect  and to  Ensure:  State  Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in  THE  INTERNATIONAL  BILL  OF RIGHTS:  THE  COVENANT  ON
CIVIL  AND  POLITICAL  RIGHTS  72,  73-75  (Louis  Henkin  ed.,  1981)  (proposing  that  the
phrase  be  read  disjunctively).
72.  Id.  at  74;  MANFRED  NOWAK,  U.N.  COVENANT  ON  CIVIL  AND  POLITICAL
RIGHTS:  CCPR  COMMENTARY  41-42  (1993).
73.  NOWAK,  supra note  72,  at  36-38.
74.  Buergenthal,  supra note  71,  at  74,  411  n.9;  NOWAK,  supra note  72,  at  41.
75.  NOWAK,  supra  note  72,  at  41-43;  DOMINIC  MCGOLDRICK,  THE  HUMAN
RIGHTS  COMMITTEE:  ITS  ROLE  IN  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL COVE-
NANT  ON  CIVIL  AND  POLITICAL  RIGHTS  181-82  (1991).
76.  See  A.H.  Robertson,  The  Implementation  System:  International Measures, in
THE  INTERNATIONAL  BILL  OF  RIGHTS:  THE  COVENANT  ON  CIVIL  AND  POLITICAL
RIGHTS  332,  337  (Louis  Henkin  ed.,  1981)  (explaining  that  the  Covenant  creates  the
Human  Rights  Committee  as  the  principal  international  organ  to  oversee  its  imple-
mentation).  The  Committee's  General  Comments  and  decisions  in  individual  cases
have  become  a  major  source  for  interpretation  of  the  Covenant.  See  generally
MCGOLDRICK,  supra note  75  (expounding  covenant  on  basis  of committee's  comments
and  decisions);  NOWAK,  supra note  72  (same).
77.  Vidal  Martins  v.  Uruguay  (No.  57/1979)  (1982),  reprinted in  Human  Rights
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leave  any  country  and  to  enter one's  own  country,  protected  under  Arti-
cle  12  of  the  Covenant,  could  be  vitiated  if they  imposed  no  extrater-
ritorial  obligations.78
More  directly relevant  were  a  pair  of cases,  decided  in  1981,  involv-
ing extraterritorial  abductions  by  Uruguayan  security  forces  of Uruguay-
an  citizens  in  neighboring  countries.'  The  Human  Rights  Committee
stated:
Article 2(1)  of the Covenant  places  an  obligation  upon a  State  party
to  respect and  to  ensure  rights  "to  all  individuals  within  its ter-ritory  and
subject to  its jurisdiction",  but  it  does  not  imply  that  the  State  party con-
cerned  cannot be  held  accountable  for violations  of rights  under  the Cove-
nant which  its agents  commit upon  the  territory  of another  State,  whether
with  the acquiescence  of the Government  of that  State  or  in opposition  to
it. According  to  article  5(1)  of the Covenant:
Nothing  in  the  present  Covenant  may  be  interpreted  as  implying  for
any  State,  group  or  person  any  right  to  engage  in  any  activity  or  per-
form  any  act  aimed  at  the  destruction  of any  of the  rights  and  free-
doms recognized  herein or  at their limitation to  a greater  extent than  is
provided  for in  the present  Covenant.
In  line  with  this,  it would  be  unconscionable  to  so  interpret  the  respon-
sibility  under  article  2 of the Covenant  as  to  permit  a  State  party  to  per-
petrate  violations  of the Covenant  on  the  territory  of another  State,  which
violations  it could  not  perpetrate  on  its own territory.,
Professor  Tomuschat  appended  individual  concurring  opinions  in  both
cases,  questioning  the  applicability  of Article  5,  but  agreeing  that  a cor-
Committee,  1 Selected  Decisions  under  the  Optional  Protocol  122  (1985)  [hereinafter
Selected  Decisions];  Lichtensztejn  v.  Uruguay  (No.  77/1980)  (1983),  reprinted in 2
Selected  Decisions  102  (1990);  Pereira  Montero  v. Uruguay  (No.  10611981)  (1983)
reprinted in  2  Selected  Decisions  136;  Varela  Ndifiez  v. Uruguay,  (No.  10811981)
(1983)  reprinted in 2  Selected  Decisions  143.
78.  Id.
79.  See  Lpez  Burgos  v. Uruguay  (No.  52/1979)  (1981)  reprinted  in I  Selected
Decisions  88,  91  (finding  extraterritorial  violations  of Articles  7 (including  torture)  and
9(1)  (arbitrary  arrest  and  detention),  as  well  as  violations  in Uruguay  of  Articles  7.
9(1),  9(3)  (trial  without  unreasonable  delay).  14(3)(d)  (right  to  chosen  counsel  at  trial),
14(3)(g)  (right  against  compelled  self-incrimination),  and  22(1)  (right  to  trade  union
activities));  Celiberti  de  Casariego  v. Uruguay  (No.  5611979)  (1981)  reprinted in  I
Selected  Decisions  92,  94  (finding  an  extraterritorial  violation  of article  9(1).  as  well
as  violations  in Uruguay  of  Articles  10(1)  (conditions  of detention),  14(3)(b)  (right  to
chosen  counsel  before  trial)  and  14(3)(c)  (trial  without  undue  delay)).
80.  Ltpez Burgos, supra note  79,  at  91.
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rect  interpretation  of Article 2  includes  a nation's  responsibility  for  some
activity  occurring  outside  the national  boundaries.8
Concededly,  these  cases  involve  an  abduction  of the  state's  own  citi-
zens  in  foreign  territory  before  they  are  brought  within  the  state's  own
borders  and  not  an  abduction  of aliens  on  the  high  seas  preliminary  to
forced  repatriation.  The  general  principle,  however,  that  a  State  Party
may  not  evade  its  obligation  to respect  human  rights  by  carrying  out  its
activities  outside  its  boundaries  applies  equally  to  both  situations.  A
state  that  "interdicts"  vessels  on  the  high  seas  is  exercising  jurisdiction
over their  occupants,  and  when  it  deprives  refugees  of their  freedom  to
sail  on,  and  forcibly  returns  them  to  their  country  of origin,  it  is  active-
ly subjecting  them  to  the authority  of their  oppressors.
B.  SOERING  IN  STRASBOURG
To  understand  the  nonrefoulement  consequences  of  the  Covenant,  it
would  be  useful  to  turn  briefly  to  the  European  human  rights  system.
From the  U.S.  perspective,  the  European  Court  of Human  Rights  deliv-
ered  one  of its  most  striking  decisions  in  Soering v.  United Kingdom."
81.  Id.  at  92.  Professor  Tomuschat's  analysis  of  Article  2  is  too  long  for  the
text,  but  short  enough  for the  margin:
To  construe  the  words  "within  its  territory"  pursuant  to  their  strict  literal  mean-
ing  as  excluding  any  responsibility  for  conduct  occurring  beyond  the  national
boundaries  would,  however,  lead  to  utterly  absurd  results.  The  formula  was
intended  to  take  care  of  objective  difficulties  which  might  impede  the  imple-
mentation  of the  Covenant  in  specific  situations.  Thus,  a  State  party  is  normally
unable  to  ensure  the  effective  enjoyment  of  the  rights  under  the  Covenant  to  its
citizens  abroad,  having  at  its  disposal  only  the  tools  of  diplomatic  protection
with  their  limited  potential.  Instances  of  occupation  of  foreign  territory  offer
another  example  of  situations  which  the  drafters  of the  Covenant  had  in  mind
when  they  confined  the  obligation  of  State  parties  to  their  own  territory.  All
these  factual  patterns  have  in  common,  however,  that  they  provide  plausible
grounds  for denying  the  protection  of  the  Covenant.  It  may  be  concluded,  there-
fore,  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  drafters,  whose  sovereign  discretion  cannot
be  challenged,  to  restrict  the  territorial  scope  of  the  Covenant  in  view  of such
situations  where  enforcing  the  Covenant  would  be  likely  to  encounter  excep-
tional  obstacles.  Never  was  it  envisaged,  however,  to  grant  states  parties  unfet-
tered  discretionary  power  to  carry  out  wilful  and  deliberate  attacks  against  the
freedom  and  personal  integrity  of  their  citizens  living  abroad.  Consequently,
despite  the  wording  of  article  2(1),  the  events  which  took  place  outside  Uru-
guay  come  within  the  purview  of  the  Covenant.
It  is  unclear  how  much  significance  Tomuschat  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the  victims
were  the  state's  own  citizens.
82.  161  Eur.  Ct.  H.R.  1 (ser.  A)  (1989).
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The  court  prevented  the  United  Kingdom's  extradition  of  a  capital  de-
fendant  to  the  United  States  because  the  extradition  would  expose  him
to  a risk  of inhuman  or degrading  treatment  in  the United  States.'  The
case  has  sparked  a great  deal  of comment"  and  has  importance  for  this
article  both  in its  general  propositions  on  human  rights  and  in  its influ-
ence  on U.S.  reservations  to the Covenant.'
Jens Soering was  an eighteen  year old  West  German  student  attending
the  University  of Virginia  when  he  and  his  girlfriend  killed  her  parents
in  March  1985.'  The  pair  then  fled  to  England,  where  they  were  ar-
rested  on  other  charges.'  Subsequently,  the  United  States  requested
extradition  for  trial  back  in  Virginia.'  The  European  Court  of  Human
Rights  viewed  the proposed  extradition  as a violation  of Article  3 of the
European  Human Rights  Convention,  which provides  that  "[n]o  one shall
be  subjected to  torture  or to  inhuman  or degrading  treatment  or punish-
ment."89  It  concluded  that  the  death  penalty  itself  did  not  necessarily
constitute  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment  within  the
meaning  of the  Convention."  Nonetheless,  it believed  that  after  a  capi-
tal  sentence  in Virginia, U.S.  procedures  would  likely  subject  Soering to
the  "death  row  phenomenon,"'"  which  it  described  as  confinement  in  a
strict  custodial  regime  for  many years  under  "the  anguish  and  mounting
tension  of  living  in  the  ever-present  shadow  of  death."  In  view  of
83.  Id.  at  44-45.  Ultimately,  the  UK  extradited  Soering  after  the  United  States
gave  assurances  that  it would  not  impose  the  death  penalty;  he was  convicted  of  both
murders  and  sentenced  to  two  terms  of life  imprisonment.  Va.  Court Upholds Murder
Convictions, WASH.  POST,  Mar.  17,  1992,  at  D7.
84.  See,  e.g.,  Richard  B.  Lillich,  The  Soering  Case,  85  AM.  J.  INT'L  L  128
(1991);  Michael  P.  Shea,  Note,  Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights  in  Ex-
tradition Cases after Soering, 17  YALE  J.  INT'L  L.  85  (1992);  Colin Warbrick,  Coher-
ence  and the European Court of Human  Rights: The  Adjudicative Background to  the
Soering Case,  11  MICH.  J.  INT'L  L.  1073  (1990);  Stephan  Breitenmoser  & Gunter  E.
Wilms,  Human Rights  v.  Extradition: The  Soering  Case,  11  Micil.  J.  INT'L  L  845
(1990).
85.  Infra note  121  and  accompanying  text.
86.  Soering,  161  Eur.  Ct.  H.R.  (ser.  A)  at  11-12.
87.  id.  at  11.
88.  Id. at  12.
89.  Convention  for  the  Protection  of Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms,
Nov.  4,  1950,  art. 3,  213  U.N.T.S.  221,  224.
90.  Soering,  161  Eur. Ct  H.R.  (ser.  A)  at  39-41.
91.  ld.  at 41.
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Soering's  age  and  disturbed  mental  state, 93  and  the  practical  alternative
of extraditing  him  for  trial  in  Germany  (where  there  is  no  death  penal-
ty)'  the  Court  concluded  that  extradition  to  the  United  States  would
amount  to  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment. 95
The  United  States,  of course,  is  not  a  party  to  the  European  Human
Rights  Convention,  and  the  Court  emphasized  that  it  was  not  adjudicat-
ing  U.S.  conduct.96  Rather,  it  stated,  "in  so  far  as  any  liability  under
the  Convention  is  or  may  be  incurred,  it  is  liability  incurred  by  the
extraditing  state by reason  of its  having  taken  action  which  has  as  direct
consequence  the exposure  of an  individual  to  proscribed  ill-treatment."'
The  Court  explained:
It  would  hardly  be  compatible  with  the  underlying  values  of the Conven-
tion,  that  "common  heritage  of  political  traditions,  ideals,  freedom,  and
the  rule  of  law"  to  which  the  Preamble  refers,  were  a  Contracting  State
knowingly  to  surrender  a  fugitive  to  another  State  where  there  were  sub-
stantial  grounds  for  believing  that  he  would  be  in  danger  of being  sub-
jected  to  torture,  however  heinous  the crime  allegedly  committed.  Extradi-
tion  in  such  circumstances,  while  not  explicitly  referred  to  in  the  brief
and  general  wording  of Article  3, would  plainly  be  contrary  to  the  spirit
and  intention  of the  Article,  and  in  the  Court's  view  this  inherent  obli-
gation  not  to  extradite  also  extends  to  cases  in  which  the  fugitive  would
be  faced  in  the  receiving  State  by  a  real  risk  of exposure  to  inhuman  or
degrading  treatment  or punishment  proscribed  by  that  Article.9"
This  principle  of  the  state's  responsibility  for  the  foreseeable  conse-
quences  of handing  over  an  individual  to  a  country  where  he  fears  mis-
treatment  was  not an  innovation  in European  human  rights jurisprudence.
For  decades,  the  European  Commission  of  Human  Rights  had  treated
article  3  as prohibiting  extradition  or  deportation  to  a  country  where  an
alien  faces  serious  human  rights  violations."  Since  Soering, the  Europe-
93.  Id. at  43.
94.  Id.  at  44.  German  criminal  law  extends  to  murders  committed  by  German
nationals  outside  Germany.  Id.
95.  Id. at  44-45.
96.  Id. at  32-36.
97.  Id. at  36.  The  Court  did  not  accept  the  sweeping  principle  that  an  individual
can  never  be  sent  to  a  country  without  confidence  that  the  conditions  awaiting  him
fully  accord  with  every  provision  of the  Convention.  Id. at  33-34.  The  Court  empha-
sized  that  it  was  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  absolute  and  nonderogable  prohibition
in  Article  3  that  barred  the  extradition.  Id.  at  34-35.
98.  Id. at  35.
99.  Kirkwood  v.  United  Kingdom,  App.  No.  10479/83,  37  Eur.  Comm'n  H.R.
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an  Court  of Human  Rights  has  also  confirmed  that  the  same  reasoning
applies  to the foreseeable  consequences  of a deportation."0
C.  NONREFOULEMENT  AND  THE HUMAN  RIGHTS  COMMITTEE
The  principle  that  refoulement  of refugees  to  a  country  where  they
face  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment-or  worse-violates  a state's  obli-
gation  not  to  subject  individuals  to  such  treatment  also  figures  in  the
Human  Rights  Committee's  interpretation  of  the  Covenant.  The
Committee  stated  its  position  clearly  in  1992  in  its  General  Comment
No. 20  on the prohibition  of torture:
In  the  view  of the  Committee,  States  parties  must  not expose  individuals
to  the  danger of torture or  cruel.  inhuman  or degrading  treatment  or  pun-
ishment upon  return to  another country  by  way of their extradition,  expul-
sion  or  refoulement.  States  parties  should  indicate  in  their  reports  what
measures  they have  adopted  to  that  end.''
The Human  Rights  Committee  recently  analyzed  the  interaction  of Arti-
cles  6  and  7  with  the  extradition  process  in  Kindler v.  Canada,"  a
Dec.  &  Rep.  158  (1984);  Altun  v.  Federal  Republic  of Germany,  App.  No.  10308183,
36  Eur.  Comm'n  H.R.  Dec.  &  Rep.  209,  231-32  (1983);  X.  v.  Federal  Republic  of
Germany,  App.  No.  1802/62,  1963  Y.B.  Eur.  Cony.  on  H.L  462,  480  (Eur.  Comm'n
on  H.R.).
100.  See  Cruz  Varas  v.  Sweden,  201  Eur.  Ct.  H.R.  (ser.  A)  at  28  (1991)  (Plenary
Court)  (finding,  by  an  eighteen-to-one  vote,  no  violation  on  the  facts):  Vilvarajah  v.
United  Kingdom,  215  Eur.  Ct.  H.R.  (ser.  A)  at  34  (1991)  (finding,  by  an  eight-to-one
vote,  no  violation  on  the  facts).
101.  General  Comment  No.  20,  1  9  (April  3,  1992)  (Prohibition  of  torture),  re-
printed in  Compilation of General Comments and  General Recommendations Adopted
by  Human  Rights  Treaty  Bodies  at  29,  U.N.  Doc.  HRIIGEN/I  (1992).  The  General
Comment  on  the  position  of aliens  may  express  a  similar  interpretation,  but  it  does  so
less  clearly.  See  General  comment  No.  15  5  (1986),  reprinted in  Compilation of
General Comments  and  General  Recommendations Adopted  by  Human  Rights  Treaty
Bodies  at  29,  U.N.  Doc.  HRI/GEN/1  (1992).  "The  Covenant  does  not  recognize  the
right  of aliens  to  enter  or  reside  in  the  territory  of  a  State  party.  It  is  in  principle  a
matter  for  the  State  to  decide  who  it  will  admit  to  its  territory.  However,  in  certain
circumstances  an  alien  may  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  covenant  even  in  relation  to
entry  or residence,  for  example,  when  considerations  of non-discrimination,  prohibition
of inhuman treatment and  respect  for  family  life  arise."  See  also  Ines  Torres  v.  Fin-
land,  No.  291/1988  (Hum.  Rts.  Comm.  1990),  reprinted in  Report of  the Hum.  Rts.
Comm.,  45th  Sess.,  at  96,  U.N.  Doec.  A/45/40,  Vol.  I  (1990)  (rejecting,  on  the  facts.
the  claim  that extradition  to  Spain  violated  Article  7  due  to  the  likelihood  of torture).
102.  Comm.  No.  470/1991,  Report of the Human  Rights  Committee, 48th  Sess.,  at
138,  U.N.  Doc.  A/48/40,  Vol.  11 (1993).234  AM.  U. J. INT'L L.  & POL'Y
rough  parallel  to  Soering. Joseph  Kindler,  a  U.S.  citizen,  had  escaped
from  prison  and  fled  to  Canada  after  his  conviction  for  capital  murder
and  kidnapping  in  Pennsylvania. 3  The  Canadian  Minister  of  Justice
decided  to  extradite  Kindler  to  the  United  States  without  seeking  assur-
ances  that  the  U.S.  would  not  impose  the  death  penalty.'"  The  Su-
preme  Court  of Canada  upheld  this  decision  as  consistent  with  the  Cana-
dian  Charter  of  Rights  and  Freedoms.0  Kindler  then  challenged  the
extradition  before the Human  Rights  Committee,  alleging, inter alia, that
the  death  penalty  would  violate  his  right  to  life,  that  it  was  cruel  and
inhuman,  and  that  conditions  awaiting  him  on  death  row  were  cruel,
inhuman  and  degrading."°  The  majority  of  the  Committee  found  no
violation  on  the  merits,"°  but  viewed  Canada's  obligations  as  depend-
ing  on the treatment  Kindler would  receive  as  a result  of his  extradition
to  the United  States.
0 8
In its  analysis  of the  admissibility  of the communication,  the  Commit-
tee majority  observed:
Article  2 of the  Covenant  requires  States parties  to guarantee  the  rights  of
persons  within  their jurisdiction.  If a  person  is lawfully  expelled  or extra-
dited,  the  State  party  concerned  will  not  generally  have  responsibility
under  the Covenant  for  any  violations  of that person's  right  that  may  later
occur  in  the  other  jurisdiction.  In  that  sense  a  State  party  clearly  is  not
required  to  guarantee  the  rights  of  persons  within  another  jurisdiction.
However,  if  a  State  party  takes  a  decision  relating  to  a  person  within  its
jurisdiction,  and  the  necessary  and  foreseeable  consequence  is  that  the
person's  rights  under the  Covenant  will  be violated  in  another jurisdiction,
the  State  party  itself  may  be  in  violation  of  the  Covenant.  That  follows
from  the  fact  that  a  State  party's  duty  under  article  2  of  the  Covenant
would  be  negated  by  the  handing  over  of  a  person  to  another  State
(whether  a  State  party  to  the  Covenant  or  not)  where  treatment  contrary
to  the Covenant  is certain  or  is the  very purpose  of the handing  over. For
example,  a  State  party  would  itself be  in  violation  of the  Covenant  if it
handed  over  a  person  to  another  State  in  circumstances  in  which  it  was
foreseeable  that  torture  would  take  place."°
103.  Kindler, Comm.  No.  470/1991,  1, 2.1.
104.  Id. 1  2.3.
105.  Kindler  v.  Canada,  2  S.C.R.  779  (S.Ct.  Canada  1991).
106.  Id.
107.  Id.  18.
108.  Id.  15.3.
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Thus,  the Human  Rights  Committee  agreed  with  the  court's  analysis
in Soering that  the  prohibition  of  torture  and  lesser  forms  of  inhuman
and  degrading  treatment  entailed  an  obligation  not to  return  an  alien  to
a  country  where  a  sufficient  risk  of such  treatment  existed."'  In  reach-
ing  the  merits,  however,  the  Committee  majority  distinguished  Soering
with  regard  to  particular  factors  that  had  led  to  the  court's  conclusion
that the  "death  row  phenomenon"  would  amount  to  inhuman  or degrad-
ing  treatment  of  the  individual."'  The  Committee  also  reiterated  its
own prior decision  that prolonged  detention  on death  row,  pending post-
conviction  remedies,  would  not  ordinarily  constitute  cruel,  inhuman  or
degrading  treatment  within  the  meaning  of the  Covenant."
The Committee  also  examined  the  merits  of Kindler's  contention  that
extradition  violated  his  right  to  life."'  It  emphasized  that  the  proceed-
ing  concerned:
Nlot  whether  Mr. Kindler's  rights  have  been  or are  likely  to be  violated
by  the  United  States  which  is  not  a  party  to  the  Optional  Protocol,  but
whether  by  extraditing  Mr.  Kindler  to  the United  States  Canada  exposed
him  to  a real  risk of a violation  of his  right  under the  Covenant."'
The majority  concluded  that  the continued  existence  of the  death  penalty
in  the  United  States,  within  the  limits  tolerated  by  Article  6(2)  of  the
110.  The  level  of  probability  contemplated  by  the  Committee  as  engaging  the
state's  responsibility  is  not  clear,  some  portions  of the  text  quoted  above  suggest  fore-
seeability  as  the  standard,  whereas  other  portions  suggest  certainty  or  purpose.  While
analyzing  Kindler's  situation,  the  majority  looked  for  a  "real  risk  of  a  violation"  of
Article  6.  Id  14.3.  Additionally,  a  separate  opinion  offered  a  standard  requiring  a
showing  of "reasonable  cause  to  believe  that  such  violations  would  probably  occur."
Id.  app.  A  4  (Mr.  Kurt  Hemdl  and  Mr.  Waleed  Sadi,  dissenting  from  finding  of
admissibility).
111.  Id  15.3  (citing  as  relevant  factors  for consideration  age,  mental  state,  con-
ditions  in  state  prison,  and  absence  of  another  state  to  which  the  government  could
extradite  the  defendant).
112.  Id  15.2  (citing  Martin  v.  Jamaica,  Comm.  No.  31711988  (Hum.  Rts.
Comm.  1993));  Reid  v.  Jamaica,  U.N.  GAOR,  Hum.  Rts.  Comm.  No.  25011987.  45th
Sess.,  Supp.  No.  40,  at  85,  11.6,  U.N.  Doc.  A/45/40  (1990);  Pratt  & Morgan  v.
Jamaica,  U.N.  GAOR,  Hum.  Rts.  Comm.  No.  210/1986,  44th  Sess..  at  222.  13.6.
U.N.  Doc.  A/44/40  (1989).
113.  Kindler, Comm.  No.  470/1991,  13.1.
114.  Id  The  reference  to  the  Optional  Protocol  concerns  the  procedure  by  which
individuals  who  believe  that  a  state  party  has  violated  rights  under  the  Covenant  may
bring  their  cases  before  the  Human  Rights  Committee.  See  NOWAK,  supra note  72,  at
647-49.  The  United  States  unlike  Canada,  has  not  consented  to  the  committee's  re-
ceipt of such  communications.
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Covenant,  would  not  give  rise  to  a  violation  of Kindler's  rights  against
Canada  under Article  6(1)  of the  Covenant."5
Although  some of the Committee's  analysis  of the  Article 6  issue was
written,  like  the  Soering case  and  like  its  General  Comment  No.  20,  in
terms  of the  state's  obligation  not  to  expose  an  individual  to  a  violation
of  his  rights,  other  portions  stressed  Canada's  express  obligation  under
Article  6(1)  to protect the  right  to  life.  The  second  sentence  of Article
6(1)  provides  that  the  right  to  life  "shall  be  protected  by  law."'"6
Moreover,  the majority  explicitly  stated:
The  starting  point  for  an  examination  of this issue  must  be the  obligation
of  the  State  party  under  article  2,  paragraph  1, of the  Covenant,  namely,
to  ensure to  all  individuals  within  its  territory  and  subject  to  its jurisdic-
tion  the rights  recognized  in the  Covenant."7
These  passages  reflect  a  different  way  of  looking  at  the  state's
nonrefoulement  obligation.  The  emphasis  on  exposure  to  violations  of
rights  treats  refoulement  as  an  affirmative  state  action,  engaging  the
state's  responsibility  for  the  resulting  violation,  and  recalling  the  state's
obligation  under  Article  2  to  respect (i.e.,  not  violate  or  participate  in
violation  of) human  rights.  The  emphasis  on protection  against  violations
treats  refoulement  as  a  failure  of state  action, falling  short  of the  state's
obligation  under  Article  2  to  ensure  human  rights.  Nothing  in  the
115.  Kindler,  Comm.  No.  470/1991,  g[  14.3-14.4.  Article  6(1)  of  the  Covenant
guarantees  the  right  to  life,  requires  its  protection,  and  prohibits  arbitrary  deprivation
of  life.  Covenant, supra note  5,  art.  6(1).  Article  6(2)  of  the  Covenant  provides  limits
for  those  states  that  retain  the  death  penalty.  Id.  art.  6(2).  The  death  penalty  may
only  be  imposed  for  the  most  serious  crimes  according  to  the  law  effective  at  the
time  of  the  crime.  Id.  Furthermore,  the  death  penalty  may  only  be  imposed  after  a
final  decision  by  a  competent  court.  Id.
Accordingly,  the  majority  held,  "[i]f  Mr.  Kindler  had  been  exposed  through
extradition  from  Canada,  to  a  real  risk  of  a  violation  of  Article  6,  Paragraph  2,  in
the  United  States,  that  would  have  entailed  a  violation  by  Canada  of  its  obligations
under  article  6(1)."  Kindler, Comm.  No.  470/1991,  1  14.3.  Several  members  of  the
Committee  argued  in  dissent  that  Canada,  as  a  state  that  had  abolished  the  death
penalty,  could  not  claim  the  benefit  of  article  6(2),  and  was  obliged  under  article  6(l)
not  to  extradite  Kindler  without  seeking  assurances  that  the  United  States  would  not
impose  the  death  penalty,  regardless  of  whether  the  United  States  remained  within  the
limits  of  article  6(2).  Id.  app.  B  (Mr.  Bertil  Wennergren,  dissenting);  id.  app.  C,
3.3  (Mr.  Rajsoomer  Lallah,  dissenting);  id.  app.  D  (Mr.  Fausto  Pocar,  dissenting);  id.
app.  E  (Ms.  Christine  Chanet,  dissenting);  id.  app.  F  (Mr.  Francisco  Jose  Aguilar
Urbina,  dissenting).
116.  Covenant,  supra note  5,  art.  6(1).
117.  Kindler, Comm.  No.  470/1991,  1  13.1  (emphasis  added).
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Kindler  case  required  the  Human  Rights  Committee  to  choose  between
these  interpretations.  The  variation  between  the  two  phrasings  suggests
that its members  may  not have  focused  on  the  distinction.
As  parallel  ways  of  thinking  about  refoulement,  these  alternative
interpretations  supplement  each  other.  The  Kindler  case  then  doubly
reinforces  the conclusion  that  deporting  an  alien  to  a  country  where  he
faces  extrajudicial  killing  would  violate  Article  6  of  the  Covenant  and
that  deporting  an  alien  to  a  country  where  he  faces  torture,  or  cruel,
inhuman  or degrading  treatment  or  punishment  would  violate  Article  7
of the Covenant.  In  either  case,  there  would be  no  need  to  show  perse-
cution  on one  of the  five  Refugee  Convention  grounds.
It  is  conceivable,  however,  that  these  interpretations  are  not  alterna-
tives,  but  rather  that  the  interpretation  emphasizing  the  protection  of
human  rights  excludes  an  emphasis  on  avoiding  exposure  to  violations
as  a consequence  of the  obligation  to  respect  human  rights.  If this  were
taken  to  be the correct  interpretation  of the  Covenant  and  if the  obliga-
tions  to  respect  and  to  ensure  human  rights  have  different  territorial
application,  then  it  might  be  concluded  that  the  obligations  of
nonrefoulement  under  Articles  6  and  7  apply  only  within  a  state's terri-
tory,  and  not to  all persons  otherwise  within  the  state's jurisdiction.
D.  U.S.  ADHERENCE  AND  RESERVATIONS
TO  THE  COVENANT
The  United  States  has  already  adhered  to  the  International  Covenant
on  Civil and  Political  Rights.  President  Carter  originally  sent the  Cove-
nant  to  the  Senate  for  its  advice  and  consent  in  1978. "8  President
Bush  renewed  the  request  for  Senate  action  in  August  1991,"9 and  the
Senate  gave  its  consent  on  April  2,  1992."  The  United  States  deposit-
ed  its  instrument  of ratification  on  June  8,  1992,  and  the  Covenant  has
been  in force  for the  United  States  since  September  8,  1992.2'
The  scope  of U.S.  obligations  under  the  Covenant,  however,  must  be
understood  in  light  of  the  series  of  reservations,  understandings  and
declarations  with  which  the  United  States  qualified  its  ratification.'"
118.  INTERNATIONAL  COVENANT  ON  CiVIL  AND  PotmcAL  Ri;rTs.  SEN.  ExEc.
REP.  No.  23,  102d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  2  (1992)  [hereinafter  SN.  EXEC.  REP.I.
119.  Id
120.  138  CONG.  REC.  S4783  (daily  ed.  Apr.  2,  1992).
121.  John  Quigley,  Criminal Law  and Human  Rights:  Implications of  the  United
States  Ratification  of the  International Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  6
HARV.  HUM.  RTs.  J.  59,  60  nn.12-13  (1993).
122.  138  CONG.  REC.  S4783-84  (daily  ed.  Apr.  2,  1992);  David  P.  Stewart.  U.S.
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While  there  are  doubts  about  the  validity  of some of these  reservations,
understandings  and  declarations,  or  about  their  binding  character,''  this
article  assumes  arguendo  that  they  successfully  modify  the  United
States'  obligations,  and  examines  how  the  modifications  affect  the  ter-
ritorial  and  extraterritorial  nonrefoulement  obligations  under  the  Cove-
nant.
The  second  reservation  addresses  U.S.  obligations  regarding  the  right
to  life.'24  According  to  the  reservation,  the  United  States  reserves  the
right  to  impose the death penalty  on  any  person convicted  in  accordance
with  the  law,  including  minors,  but  excluding  pregnant  women."z  This
reservation  shields  capital  punishment  policy  in  the  United  States  from
Article  6 of the  Covenant,  including  its prohibition  on executing  persons
who  committed  crimes  as  juveniles2 6  and  its  limitation  of  the  death
penalty  to  "the  most  serious  crimes."' 2"  The  reservation,  however,  re-
lates  solely  to  lawful  capital  punishment  in  the  United  States.  There  is
no  reservation,  understanding,  or  declaration  limiting  U.S.  obligation  to
protect  individuals  against  murder  within  the  United  States'  or  its  re-
sponsibility  not  to  hand  refugees  over to  a  foreign  country  where  they
face  extrajudicial  murder.29
There  is  no  reservation,  understanding  or  declaration  limiting  U.S.
obligations  with  regard  to  torture  under  Article  7.130  The  third  reserva-
tion  addresses  the prohibition  against  "cruel,  inhuman  or degrading  treat-
ment or punishment"  under article  7  as  follows:
Ratification  of  the  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political Rights:  The  Significance of  the
Reservations,  Understandings and Declarations, 14  HUM.  RTS.  L.J. 77  (1993)  [herein-
after Stewart,  US Ratification].
123.  Quigley,  supra note  121,  at  5  nn.32-41;  Ved  P.  Nanda,  The  United States
Reservation  to  the  Ban  on  the  Death Penalty for Juvenile  Offenders:  An  Appraisal
Under the  International Covenant on  Civil and Political Rights, 42  DEPAUL  L.  REV.
1311,  1331-32  (1993).
124.  138  CONG.  REC.  S4783  (daily  ed.  Apr.  2,  1992)  (Reservation  No.  2).
125.  Id.
126.  Covenant,  supra note  5,  art.  6(5);  SEN.  EXEC.  REP.,  supra note  133,  at  11;
see  Stanford  v.  Kentucky,  492  U.S.  361  (1989)  (upholding  the  death  penalty  for
crimes  committed  by  persons  at  age  17).
127.  Covenant,  supra note  5,  art.  6(2);  SEN.  EXEC.  REP.,  supra note  118,  at  11.
128.  138  CONG.  REc.  54783  (daily  ed.  April  2,  1992).
129.  Id.  In  fact,  the  reservations  may  not  even  exclude  a  U.S.  obligation,  not  to
extradite  individuals  to  countries  where  they  face  the  death  penalty  for  a  capital  crime
committed  while  under  eighteen  years  of  age.  Id.
130.  See  id. (listing  the  Reservations  to  the  adoption  of  the  Covenant).
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That  the  United  states  considers  itself  bound  by  Article  7  to  the  extent
that  "cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment"  means  the
cruel  and  unusual  treatment  or punishment  prohibite4  by  the Fifth,  Eighth,
and/or  Fourteenth  Amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United
States.1
3'
This  reservation  was  motivated  by  international  decisions  like  Soering,
holding  that  the "death  row  phenomenon"  was  or  could  be  cruel,  inhu-
man  or  degrading.  The  legislative  history  makes  clear  that  the  Bush
Administration's  attention  to  the  interpretations  of  the  Human  Rights
Committee  and  the  European  Court of  Human  Rights,  and  its  desire  to
leave  room  for  capital  punishment,  corporal  punishment,  and  solitary
confinement.'
The  reservation  to Article 7  appears  ambiguous.  Does  it mean  that the
United  States  considers  itself bound  only to  respect and  ensure  the  right
of individuals  not to  be  subjected  to  cruel  and  unusual  treatment or pun-
ishment when that  treatment would  violate  the  listed  amendments  to  the
Constitution?  Or  does  it  mean  that  the  United  States  considers  itself
bound  only  to  respect  and  ensure  the  right  of  individuals  not  to  be
subjected  to  treatment  or  punishment  that,  if  carried  out  by  official
action  in  the  United  States,  would  amount  to  the  cruel  and  unusual
treatment  or  punishment  prohibited  by  the  listed  amendments?  Unlike
the provisions  of the  Torture  Convention,  Article  7  of the  Covenant,  in
conjunction  with  the  undertakings  clause  of Article  2,  requires  the  state
to  protect  individuals  against  mistreatment  by  non-state  actors."  The
United  States has  not attempted  to  limit  its  obligation  under article  7  to
131.  Id. (Reservation  No.  3).
132.  See  SEN.  EXEC.  REP.,  supra note  118,  at  12  (providing  the  administration's
"Explanation  of Proposed  Reservations,  Understandings  and  Declarations");  Stewart.  US
Ratification, supra  note  122  (explaining  Reservation  No.  3).  The  Senate  adopted  a
similar  reservation  to  the  Torture  Convention,  which  has,  in  addition  to  its  provisions
regarding  torture,  provisions  regarding  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  pun-
ishment.  See  136  CONG.  REC.  S17,491  (daily  ed.  Oct.  27,  1990)  (listing  Reservation
No.  I to  the  Torture  Convention).  The Torture  Convention  does  not,  however,  prohibit
refoulement  to  a  country  where  an  individual  faces  the  danger  of cruel,  inhuman  or
degrading  treatment  or  punishment  that  does  not  rise  to  the  level  of torture.
133.  See  Human  Rights  Committee,  General  Comment  No.  20. 1 2  (April  3.  1992)
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by  Human Rights  Treaty  Bodies at  29,  U.N.  Doe.  HRI/GEN/I  (1992)  ("Finally,  it  is
the  duty  of  public  authorities  to  ensure  protection  by  the  law  against  such  treatment
even  when  committed  by  persons  acting  outside  or  without  any  official  authority.");
Human  Rights  Committee,  General  Comment  No.  7,  2  (July  27,  1982).
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protect  individuals  against  private  torture,  nor  has  it  generally  used
reservations,  understandings  or  declarations  to  limit  its  obligations  to
state  action  under  other  articles  of the  Covenant.  Thus,  it  would  appear
that  the  reservation  is  intended,  as  its  language  indicates,  to  identify
"cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment or punishment"  with the kinds of
treatment  or punishment  forbidden  to  the  federal  and  state  governments
by  the  Fifth,  Eighth,  and  Fourteenth  amendments,  without  otherwise
limiting  the  scope  of U.S.  obligations  under  Article  7.
If  this  interpretation  of  the  reservation  is  correct,  then  the  reserva-
tions,  understandings  and  declarations  do  not address  the  nonrefoulement
obligations  of the  United  States under  Articles  6  and  7  of the  Covenant.
Even  if this  interpretation  is incorrect,  nothing  in  the reservations,  under-
standings  and  declarations  limits  the  nonrefoulement  obligation  under
those  articles  in  cases  of extrajudicial  murder  or torture.  It is  interesting
that  despite  the  Bush  Administration's  attention  to  the  Soering case  in
preserving  the  prerogative  of  the  United  States  to  subject  prisoners  to
the  "death  row  phenomenon"  at  home,  no  attention  was  paid  to  the
nonrefoulement  implications  of Articles  6  and  7.'  This  would  seem  to
be  equally  true  of  territorial  and  extraterritorial  nonrefoulement  obliga-
tions.  The Human  Rights  Committee's  confirmation  of the extraterritorial
applicability  of the  Covenant  long  antedated  the  proceedings  leading  to
the ratification  of the  Covenant  under the  Bush  Administration.  None  of
the  reservations,  understandings,  or  declarations  purports  to  limit  the
territorial  scope of the  United  States'  obligations.
The  consequences  for  administrative  action  are  similar  to  the  conse-
quences  of the  Torture  Convention,  except  that  the  Covenant  is  already
in  force  for  the  United  States.  The  Senate  has  declared  the  Covenant  to
be  non-self-executing,  meaning  to  exclude  the  judicial  enforcement  of
the  Covenant  as  such. 3'  The  effect  of  this  declaration  has  been  disput-
ed,"' 36  but  in  any  case  it  does  not  affect  the Attorney  General's  authori-
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the  Covenant.
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ty  and  responsibility  to  use  existing  discretionary  powers  to  safeguard
the  United  States  from  violating  the  Covenant.  The  nonrefoulement
obligations  of the Covenant  go  beyond  those that  the  United  States  will
have  under  the Torture  Convention,  to  include  cases  where  aliens  face
extrajudicial  murder.  They  probably  also  include  cases  where  aliens
face forms  of cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading  treatment  or punishment  that
do not rise  to  the  level of torture.  Since  the  Covenant  has  been  in  force
for the United  States  since  September  1992,  the  Attorney General  should
hasten to  instruct  her  subordinates  in  a preferred  means  for  compliance
with these  obligations.
CONCLUSION
If the  United  States  is  going  to  reach  out beyond  its  borders  to  sub-
ject  aliens  to  its jurisdiction,  whether  through  high  seas  interdiction  or
by  other  methods,  their  human  rights  against  the  United  States  should
also  extend  beyond  those  borders  to  limit  that  exercise  of  power.  The
U.S.  Supreme  Court  in  Sale  permitted  executive  powers  read  into  the
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act  to  extend  beyond  U.S.  borders  without
accompanying  rights;  but it did  so  on  highly  positivistic  grounds,  while
recognizing  the morally  questionable  character  of the  conduct  it  upheld.
Both  the  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  the  Convention
against  Torture  contain  nonrefoulement  obligations  that  will  bind  the
United  States  as  a  matter  of positive  law.  The  Covenant  may  provide
the  best  hope  among  the  positive  law  bases  for  restoring  the  proper
relation between jurisdiction  and  rights.
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